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GERMAN WAR GAMING
Milan Vego
 A tedious war game is the grave of interest. 
 GENERAL ALBERT KARL FRIEDRICH WILHELM VON BOGUSLAWSKI (1834–1905)
he Germans invented and developed the modern war game. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, the German-style Kriegsspiel had been adopted in most 
of the major militaries of the day. In the interwar years (1919–39), the Germans 
greatly increased the number and diversity of war games, which collectively 
became one of the main means of educating and training future commanders 
and their staffs at all levels. Prior to and during World 
War II, the Germans proved to be masters of the use 
of war games throughout the chain of command for 
rehearsing plans for pending and future operations. 
In peacetime, they used war games to test the validity 
of new doctrinal documents and for force planning. 
Though German methods of organizing and executing 
war games cannot and should not be blindly followed, 
yet many aspects of their practice could be successfully 
applied today. Moreover, the role and importance of 
war gaming should be greatly enhanced in the present 
era of smaller forces and shrinking financial resources.
THE ROOTS
The rudiments of war games go back to the Gupta 
Empire (AD 320–550) in India, where a chesslike game, 
chaturanga, was invented.1 (Some other sources say 
that a chesslike game, xianggi, originated in China.) 
In the seventh century AD, chaturanga was adopted 
in Sassanid Persia (AD 224–651) as chatrang. After 
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the Arab conquest of Persia in the seventh century, this game became known in 
Arabic as shatranj. In the ninth century, shatranj found its way to Byzantium.2 
The North African Moors spread a derivative of shatranj to the Iberian Peninsula. 
Around 822 the emir of Córdoba, in Andalusia, was introduced to the game by 
a Persian Muslim.3 This game became known as ajedrez in Spanish, xadres in 
Portuguese, and zatrikion in Greek. The game was introduced to Western Europe 
generally by Muslim merchants; its Arabic name was replaced by the Persian shah 
(king), or shah mat (the king is dead), eventually becoming “check” or “chess” in 
English. The game spread to Switzerland in 997, the northern part of Christian-
dominated Spain in 1008, southern Germany in 1050, and central Italy in 1061. 
By 1200, the game had been adopted in Britain and Scandinavia.4 
“Courier chess” was played in Germany at the beginning of the thirteenth cen-
tury.5 It was first mentioned in the great Arthurian romance Wigalois, by Wirnt 
von Gravenberg, in 1202.6 Courier chess was described in some detail in a travel 
account by Kunrat von Ammenhausen in 1337.7 
In 1616, Duke August II of Brauenschweig-Wolfenbuettel (or Lueneburg, 
1579–1666) published under the pseudonym “Gustavus Selenus” Das Schack-
oder Koenig-Spiel (Chess Game or King’s Game), in which he gave a detailed 
description of courier chess as taught in schools and played in the small village of 
Strobeck. In 1644, Christopher Weikmann of Ulm, in Bavaria, invented a modi-
fied game of chess, which he explained in his Neu-erfundenes grosses Koenig-Spiel 
(Newly Invented Great King’s Game).8 Each player had thirty pieces, and each 
piece had fourteen different fixed moves, similar to those in modern chess.9 
Weikmann’s game, called “war” (or “military”) chess, was designed to serve not 
only as a pastime but also as a means of studying the military and political prin-
ciples of the time. Weikmann’s game was extremely popular among Germans.10
A significant development came in 1780, when Dr. Johann Christian Ludwig 
Helwig, master of pages at the court of the Duke of Brunswick, invented the 
“King’s Game” (Koenigspiel). Helwig’s game used a modified chessboard with 
1,666 squares, in various colors, each color representing a certain terrain fea-
ture, such as flat ground, mountain, marshes, forests, lakes or ponds, a building, 
villages, etc. A dotted line divided the chessboard into two camps and marked 
the frontier between them.11 As in chess, each piece was named for a character 
common in the political and military world of the day (king or marshal, colonel, 
captain, lieutenant, chancellors, heralds, knights, couriers, adjutants, bodyguards, 
halberdiers, and private soldiers).12 The King’s Game was meant to encourage 
young noblemen to think about important military questions and to teach them 
basic elements of military art and science.13 Helwig’s game became very popular 
in Germany and was quickly introduced by the militaries in France, Austria, and 
Italy.14 
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The “New War Game”
Between 1780 and 1824 occurred several significant developments in military 
gaming. In 1797, Georg Venturini, a military theoretician and tactician from 
Schleswig, invented the “New War Game” (Neue Kriegsspiel).15 It was based on 
Helwig’s game but with much more numerous, detailed, and complex rules.16 A 
year later Venturini transferred the game from the chessboard to a chart, thereby 
converting it into something that could be further developed.17 By 1804 his game 
had undergone several revisions. Venturini expanded Helwig’s grid system to 
3,600 squares, each representing one square mile and colored to indicate the ter-
rain within it. In contrast to other games then in use, Venturini’s used stylized 
maps and so represented a major change from the rigid chessboard.18 
This advance was made possible by the recent advent of precise maps. In 1727 
the Dutch engineer Nicholas Cruquius had drawn the bed of the Merwede River 
with lines of equal depth (isobaths) at intervals of one fathom; a French geogra-
pher, Philippe Buache, had used a similar method, with ten-fathom intervals, in a 
chart of the English Channel prepared in 1737 and published in 1752. The same 
technique had thereafter been adapted to the terrain maps.19 
In Venturini’s game, pieces and moves approximated the ordinary marches 
of troops. The terrain was not fictional but represented actual territory between 
France and Belgium. A sixty-page rule book governed reinforcements and lo-
gistics.20 The playing pieces represented not only infantry and cavalry but also 
various supporting arms and equipment. Venturini even included restrictions on 
movement during winter months and incorporated the effects of proper support 
and provisioning of combat arms.21 His game gained popularity in Germany, 
Austria, and Italy.22 
In 1811 a Prussian counselor at Breslau, Georg Leopold Baron von Reisswitz, 
devised a war game on a sand table, with terrain modeled to the scale of 1 : 2,373. 
The game was described in his Anleitung zu einer mechanischen Vorrichtung um 
taktische Manoevers sinnlich darzustellen (Introduction to a Mechanical Gadget to 
Sensory Depiction of the Tactical Maneuver). Reisswitz’s game had a maximum 
of ten players on each side, neither side knowing about the moves of the other.23 
Troops were represented by squares of wood on which pasted symbols indicated 
various branches of service.24 Reisswitz’s game was played in a way similar to 
previous games, except that the movement of the troops was not restricted to 
chessboard squares; maneuvering and the marching of columns were much more 
realistic than before.25 Reisswitz also used a realistic-looking terrain. The game 
was directed by an umpire, or referee, known as a Vertrauter (confidant), with 
several assistants. The umpire determined the course of the game after evaluating 
movements and adjudicating decisions made by the players. Limited information 
was given to each commander regarding the strengths and disposition of the 
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opposing side, the state of roads, the season of the year, and the supply situation.26 
Each player would submit orders to the umpire, who updated the terrain table 
and told the players only what they would know at that point in an actual situa-
tion. The actions in the game progressed until victory could be declared for one 
side or another. To determine casualties, the umpire consulted complex tables 
that indicated likely attrition on the basis of characteristics of terrain, firepower, 
and other factors.27 
Reisswitz was fortunate to come in contact with a Prussian officer by the name 
of von Reiche, who was the captain of cadets at the Berlin garrison. Reiche was 
responsible for instructing Prince Friedrich and Prince Wilhelm (later king and 
kaiser, respectively) in the art of fortification. He mentioned Reisswitz’s game 
to the princes, who promptly petitioned for a demonstration for themselves 
and other invited officials at the castle in Berlin where they lived. Both princes 
enjoyed the game and told their father, King Friedrich Wilhelm III (1770–1840), 
about their experience. Witnessing a demonstration himself, the king was fasci-
nated by this new and more accurate representation of war.28
Reisswitz’s son, Lieutenant Georg Heinrich Rudolph Johann von Reisswitz, 
further improved the New War Game, describing the changes in his Anleitung zur 
Darstellung militaerischer Manoever mit dem Apparat des Kriegs-spiels (Instruc-
tion for Representation of Military Maneuvers under the Guise of a War Game, 
1824).29 Among other things, he replaced the sand table with a large-scale map 
(1 : 8,000) showing the gradient angles of mountains and valleys.30 For the first 
time, combat with battalion-sized forces was simulated.31 The junior Reisswitz 
recommended that the number of the players on each side be kept to four. His 
game was the first to use red and blue color coding for the opposing sides, a 
system still used today. The game would require at least two umpires, one for 
conducting the movement of troops and the other for determining the outcomes 
of attacks and recording losses.32 The umpires were responsible also for devising 
a realistic and interesting initial situation.33 They would present a “general idea” 
or “outline” of the situation (in modern terms, a scenario) to the players indicat-
ing the positions of the main body of troops of both sides and giving reasons for 
players to conduct moves on the board.34 If there was more than a single player on 
each side, one would be commander in chief and the other the commander of a 
major part of the force, such as the main body or vanguard. A commander would 
submit a written plan to the umpire containing the intended maneuver, orders 
to individual units, orders given to other players, the intended final position of 
troops, etc.35 Reisswitz quantified the effects of combat, so that results of engage-
ments were precisely calculated rather than debated. Rules covered virtually every 
contingency of operations of units up to the size of divisions and corps.36 
NWC_Autumn2012Review.indd   109 8/14/12   8:46 AM
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 65 [2012], No. 4, Art. 10
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss4/10
 110  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
A great novelty in the younger Reisswitz’s war game was that it emphasized the 
importance of general-staff officers.37 General Karl von Mueffling (1775–1851), 
chief of the general staff (1821–29) in Prussia, exclaimed, “It’s not a game at all! 
It’s training for war. I shall recommend it enthusiastically to the whole army.”38 
He fulfilled that promise: a royal decree directed every regiment in the Prussian 
army to play the game regularly.39 By the end of the 1820s each Prussian regiment 
was purchasing with state funds materials for war gaming.40 The junior Reiss-
witz’s game was accepted by many Prussian officers, although there were initially 
many detractors.41 Mueffling used staff rides, terrain studies, sand tables, and war 
games for educating staff officers in the assessment of a situation to solve tactical 
and strategic problems.42 Numerous war-gaming clubs sprang up in Germany. 
In 1828, Helmuth von Moltke, Sr. (1800–91, later a field marshal), joined such a 
club.43 However, Reisswitz’s game was often played in a very mechanical and su-
perficial manner, because of lack of understanding by those who directed them.44
The Moltke Era 
By the 1850s the Kriegsspiel had gained great popularity in the German military 
and some interest in the militaries of other countries. In the second part of the 
nineteenth century, logistical and fortification war games were developed in the 
Prussian (then German) army.45 The elder Moltke’s tenure as the chief of the 
general staff (1857–88) saw the start of systematic education and training of 
future operational commanders through war gaming. Between 1858 and 1881 
he personally led annual “exercise rides” (Uebungsreise), combining gaming 
and rigorous on-site investigations, aimed not only to enhance the operational 
thinking of general-staff officers but also to test and refine operational plans 
prepared for various contingencies. The rides and games were based on the 
real political-military situation of the time, enriched by historical excursions, 
especially valuable to young officers.46 War games had a positive impact on the 
combat preparedness of the Prussian army. For example, General Kraft, Prince 
zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen (1827–92), would write, “The ability to quickly arrive 
at decisions and the cheerful assumption of responsibility which characterized 
our [Prussian] officers in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 was in no small 
measure due to the war games.”47 After that war, the German style of war gaming 
was gradually adopted by the Austrian, Russian, British, French, Italian, Ameri-
can, and Japanese militaries.
Until the 1870s, war games were unpopular among the Prussian and German 
officers themselves. They were cumbersome and time consuming, because of 
overly complicated rules and adjudication processes, which made the games less 
interesting for the players. The leading proponents of these “rigid” war games 
were W. von Tschischwitz, Thilo Wolf von Trotha, and von Neumann.48 They 
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tried to systematize further and improve the rules and further improved methods 
for calculating losses.49 This situation changed—slowly at first, but then radically
—with the introduction of the “free war game” (Freie Kriegsspiel), in which pro-
fessional judgment substituted for rules. War games became more popular and 
were played more often.50 The most influential proponents of the free war gam-
ing were Major (later General) Klemens Wilhelm Jacob von Meckel (1842–1905) 
and Colonel (later General) Julius von Verdy du Vernois (1832–1910). They 
argued that umpires should render decisions based not on rules but on tacti-
cal experience. Meckel in his Anleitung zum Kriegsspiel (Instruction to the War 
Game, 1875) proposed that the director be freed from some rules, though not in 
assessing the effects of fire.51 He was not ready to make a complete break with the 
rigid style of gaming.52 
In 1876 Verdy published Beitrag zum Kriegsspiel (Contribution to the War 
Game), borrowing many ideas that Meckel had planned to elaborate on in his 
projected but unfinished three-volume work.53 Like Meckel, Verdy was concerned 
that war gaming still faced resistance among German officers. He saw the reason 
in the difficulty for beginners of handling tables, calculating losses, etc.54 The 
essence of Verdy’s approach, in contrast to that of the junior Reisswitz, was to 
strengthen the role of umpires by eliminating all written rules.55 Verdy wrote 
that war games should be conducted on the principles Moltke had used to decide 
outcomes during staff rides.56 Moltke had not determined an outcome by a roll of 
dice but on the basis of his expertise, experience, and judgment. The same should 
be done, Verdy argued, in a war game.57 
Verdy’s game required a detailed map (scale 1 : 12,000) and a general map at a 
much smaller scale (1 : 2,000–3,000), plus blocks, scales, and dividers. The play-
ers were divided into two opposing groups, with an umpire and an assistant if 
necessary in control. The umpire briefed the players (perhaps on the day prior) 
on the general situation, providing only such information as would readily be 
available to both sides in actual combat—weather, location, etc. A specific situa-
tion was outlined for each of the sides, again with only such information as would 
normally be possessed by the commander to whose operations it was relevant.58 
Initial orders and dispositions were then submitted to the umpire by each side.
In the 1870s, the Germans began to differentiate among three types of war 
game: the “small war game” (Kleine Kriegsspiel), “large war game” (Grosse 
Kriegsspiel), and “strategic war game” (Strategische Kriegsspiel). A small game 
was conducted to test the effect of the fire of units, down to the smallest it was 
possible to evaluate. The forces were limited to four to six companies, one or 
two cavalry squadrons, and a quarter or a half of a battery.59 A large game en-
compassed the tactical exercise of forces up to an army division. A strategic 
game was conducted by general-staff and senior officers for operations by army 
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corps.60 The first strategic war game had been conducted in 1848 in Berlin, under 
the direction of Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Vogel von Falckenstein. The 
scenario was a war between Prussia and Austria, and the game made an extraor-
dinary impression.61 
In the 1880s, the Germans conducted small games, known as “regimental war 
games,” simulating the employment of tactical-sized forces at each regimental head-
quarters once per month and over the winter.62 Large war games were conducted 
chiefly for divisions and the study of their transportation and supply problems, by 
senior regimental, divisional, and corps staff officers. General-staff officers played 
strategic war games, encompassing the operations and employment of armies.63 
The Schlieffen Era and World War I
During his tenure as the chief of the Great General Staff (1891–1906), Field Mar-
shal Alfred von Schlieffen (1833–1913) extensively used staff rides and war games 
to educate higher commanders and their staffs and rehearse his war plans. He led 
sixteen rides to Germany’s western border and fifteen to the eastern. Each ride 
lasted ten to fourteen days. In these rides two teams of twenty-five to thirty-five 
general-staff officers each, of all grades, played against each other. The rides were 
not social excursions but very intense evolutions; the staff officers worked long 
hours.64 All of Schlieffen’s games involved two-front warfare with France and 
Russia, sometimes also Great Britain. Thus, he assumed that the German army 
would face a numerically superior enemy.65 
Schlieffen’s war games were based on the plans being developed for war. The 
aim was to ensure that senior commanders were thoroughly familiar with Schlief-
fen’s strategic ideas and that each general-staff officer knew how he judged Ger-
many’s strategic situation. The games also enhanced the ability of each general-
staff officer to pursue the common approach once war broke out, whether or not 
he had intimate knowledge of Germany’s deployment plan.66 Schlieffen generally 
conducted two general-staff rides per year, in June and October. He conducted 
follow-up tactical-strategic problems on issues identified that he thought needed 
elaboration. They were played mostly from the perspective of the Red side—that 
is, Germany’s opponent.67 
In 1897, Schlieffen started to rehearse his plans for an invasion of France 
through Belgium. These games ended routinely with the encirclement of the 
French army. The entire focus was on the operational aspects of the German 
offensive; in none of them did Schlieffen consider the possible political and eco-
nomic consequences of an advance through neutral Belgium.68 (Some sources 
claim that he actually recognized the consequences of violation of Belgian and 
Dutch neutrality but misjudged the British attitude toward these countries.)69 
The war game conducted in 1905 is the only one for which full documentation 
survives. The scenario was a war against Russia, France, and Britain. Germany 
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would await an enemy invasion (Schlieffen assumed that both Russia and France 
would attack first), thereby avoiding violation of the neutrality of Belgium and 
the Netherlands, and only then go onto the counteroffensive. Schlieffen envisaged 
German victory within six weeks.70 The German army would defeat Russia first 
and then shift westward to fight a combined French-British army that by that 
time would have advanced into Germany through Belgium. (Despite widely held 
historical views, it seems that Schlieffen doubted Germany’s chances of success 
in a two-front war.)71 
In the 1905 war game, Schlieffen assumed that Belgium and the Netherlands 
would be neutral but would defend their neutrality; Germany would therefore 
take a defensive posture on the western front. The scenario considered it possible 
that in case of violation of their neutrality by Anglo-French forces, Belgium and 
the Netherlands would side with Germany. German forces consisted of twenty-
four army corps plus a number of reserve corps. Germany’s ally Austria-Hungary 
would not enter the war until a sizable part of the Russian army had concentrated 
on its border. Russia would attack East Prussia with its Niemen and Narva armies. 
France would concentrate its army along the entire border, from upper Alsace 
to the North Sea coast. Six British divisions would be deployed on the northern 
flank of the French army in Flanders. Belgium and the Netherlands would de-
ploy six and four divisions, respectively; the Germans rated their combat value 
as not very high.72 In the game, the course of German operations against Russia 
was almost identical to what was to happen in World War I, in the battles of Tan-
nenberg and the Masurian Lakes. The Russian side committed mistakes similar 
to those the Russians were actually to make in August 1914. It was assessed that 
the Russians were so badly beaten that their armies would present no further 
threat in the east; by the fortieth day after the start of mobilization, the mass of 
the German army in the east was available for transport to the west. In the game’s 
scenario, the western allies had in the meantime attacked German forces along 
the entire front. The main thrust was through Belgium; the bulk of the French 
active corps was deployed between Luxembourg and Antwerp.73 The Germans 
now counterattacked, eventually forcing the combined Anglo-French forces to 
surrender in the area of Liège.74
Schlieffen taught officers to fight intelligently and to think for themselves. His 
staff problems and war games did not have “school solutions.” The players were 
forced to develop their own “possibilities” (courses of action) and make their own 
decisions against agile enemies. They had to discuss their answers with, and justify 
them to, Schlieffen and their colleagues. Schlieffen tried to make the training of 
his staff officers as realistic as possible.75 Nevertheless, Schlieffen used general-staff 
rides and war games to rehearse his own operational ideas, testing how operations 
would unfold in particular scenarios and how German commanders would react 
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to enemy actions. Schlieffen also often imposed arbitrary difficulties on his own 
commanders, while at the same time making situations easier for the enemy.76
Schlieffen’s successor, General Helmuth von Moltke, Jr. (1848–1916), made 
great efforts to improve German plans prior to 1914. For example, when he 
war-gamed the Schlieffen Plan, the results indicated that the two armies on the 
outside, or far right flank, of the great wheeling movement would run out of am-
munition two days before the campaign ended; Moltke therefore organized two 
motorized ammunition battalions, the first in any army of the day. Yet the Ger-
mans did not simulate in their games the diplomatic and political consequences 
of their actions. Hence, in the event they were to be caught by surprise when their 
invasion of Belgium caused Belgian civilians to destroy their own railroads and 
brought the British Empire into the war.77
The Germans continued to use war gaming during World War I. For example, 
the German high command rehearsed the spring offensive (Kaiserschlacht—
Kaiser’s Major Battle) in a game played at the headquarters of the Army Group 
Crown Prince Rupert. Also, in testing their plan for the final offensive in August 
1918 (Operation MICHAEL), they conducted several strategic-level games.78 All 
these games showed that chances of decisive success were slim.79
The Interwar Years (1919–1939)
Between 1919 and 1939 the German military, more than any other, used war 
gaming as the main means for educating and training its officer corps. The reason 
was that the Versailles Treaty of 1919 put severe restrictions on Germany’s forces. 
Among other things, the size of the new German military, the Reichswehr, was put 
at a hundred thousand, including four thousand officers. The general staff was 
formally dissolved, although its main functions survived under different names. 
Tanks, aircraft, and U-boats were prohibited. These prohibitions stimulated 
German military leaders—led by General Hans von Seeckt (1866–1936), chief of 
the Army Command (Chef der Heeresleitung, 1920–26)—to expand greatly the 
number and types of war games as a main method of combat training.80
Seeckt was a firm believer in war of movement (Bewegungskrieg). This was 
his greatest contribution to the development of the Reichswehr and later Wehr-
macht. His idea was that the only way to prepare the Reichswehr for a war of 
movement was to focus on educating officers in theoretical aspects of warfare.81 
War games represented an important part of that education. After the end of 
Seeckt’s tenure, the Reichswehr started to play operational war games.82 
In the interwar years German operational plans were tested and rehearsed in 
a series of war games. The aim was to make commanders at all levels thoroughly 
familiar with the situation and also with the difficulties they would have to 
overcome with respect to both enemy and terrain.83 The Germans also used war 
games to test combat principles. In these games one side used the doctrine and 
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tactics of the potential enemy. The “friendly” commanders were changed several 
times, in order to bring the decisions of several persons to bear on principles to be 
tested.84 The Germans often used war games as teaching tools for the study of the 
past campaigns and operations and also for the testing and improvement of cer-
tain doctrine developed and used in the past.85 A secondary purpose of a war game 
was to give higher commanders opportunities to get to know their subordinate 
officers, observe their fitness under certain situations, and gain impressions of 
their strong and weak points. It was even thought possible to draw conclusions as 
to their qualities of mind and character. The dangers, however, of excessively one-
sided assessments of fitness or unfitness as manifested during war games were well 
understood.86 In the interwar years the Germans stressed that an officer’s promo-
tion should never be based solely on his detailed visual grasp of a situation on the 
map or on his polished appearance during a war game, or the like.87 The officer’s 
performance in the field and his character were to be the determining factors.88 
The Germans believed that war games were the best way for commanders to 
make known to subordinates their views on various aspects of warfare.89 War 
games were an important means for the “spiritual” preparation for war and for 
shaping unified tactical and strategic views.90 Yet a war game, they held, should 
never be considered proof of the correctness or incorrectness of operational 
thinking or of measures taken. Its outcome could be seen only as an example, and 
only from several such examples would it be possible to draw useful conclusions.91
In Seeckt’s era the term “war game” (Kriegsspiel) was broadened to include 
not only the traditional war game but also the planning game (Planspiel), staff 
exercise (Stabsuebung), exercise ride (Uebungsreise), terrain discussion (evalua-
tion) (Gelaendebesprechung), command staff exercise (Rahmenuebung), special 
exercise (Sonderuebung), and sand-table exercise (Sandkastenuebung).92 
The Germans considered the “war game,” as such, to be two-sided. Such games 
were conducted from the strategic to tactical levels of command. A war game 
aimed at educating all officers in the assessment of the situation (that is, the com-
mander’s estimate). The Germans emphasized the importance of concise and 
logical presentation of ideas, in making decisions and issuing orders based on 
them.93 Another purpose of a war game was training in techniques and procedures 
of writing and issuing orders. War games trained commanders at all echelons and 
tested new methods, as well as certain fundamentals, of combat.94 The sides were 
designated as Blue and Red; in a game involving allies or neutrals, they would be 
designated by other colors (Yellow, Green, etc.).95 War games proper were difficult 
to organize and play, because of the need to represent faithfully the enemy’s way 
of thinking, doctrine, and tactical procedures. 
“Planning games,” also called “planning exercises” (Planuebungen), were 
generally used for tactical and operational education of the commanders at all 
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levels.96 Specifically, they were designed for education in certain tactical concepts 
and principles. The planning games were apparently the preferred method of 
rehearsing plans for pending or future operations. They were played on maps 
at scales of 1 : 5,000 or larger.97 The idea to be tested was given by the director 
of the game; a specific episode was gamed, so that participants could acquire a 
picture of the combat situation. The focus was then on decisions for execution of 
the combat ideas, employment of individual combat means, and coordination. 
Drafting necessary orders was found most valuable. Planning games were one-
sided; the “enemy” side was played by the director.98 In that way, it was possible 
to focus more closely on a given topic.99 In the Wehrmacht, planning games were 
used for training officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the practical 
application of doctrinal fundamentals; for the reinforcement of existing states of 
combat training; for training in making decisions, estimating terrain, and using 
weapons; and for evaluation of the knowledge, abilities, and character traits of 
participants. The emphasis was on making decisions and employing forces to 
carry out an operational idea.100 Planning games were also used to prepare of-
ficers and NCOs to occupy higher positions.101 In troop training, the duration of 
a planning game was a maximum of two and a half to three hours.102 
“Staff exercises” were usually single-sided and were used to train participants 
in the functions of staffs in combat. The exercise simulated as many frictions and 
interruptions as possible.103 “Training rides” had the same purposes as war games 
and planning games. The difference was that they were conducted for several 
days and mostly in the field. At the operational level, they were used to explore 
problems in national defense. At the tactical level they were used for education 
of the commanders and their staffs in combat with combined armies and logis-
tics.104 Rides at the operational level often took the form of “operational studies,” 
especially when they were conducted in the field. They were often two-sided but 
sometimes one-sided.105
The “command staff exercise” familiarized commanders and staffs with the 
command and message system essential to attainment of the objective. Opera-
tions staffs and signal troops would take part.106 The most developed exercises 
of this type were the “commander’s exercise” (Fuehreruebung) and “communi-
cations exercise” (Nachrichtenuebung). “Special exercises” were conducted for 
several purposes. Most often they were used to test suitability of “war organiza-
tion” (Kriegsgliederung), or an order of battle, a new organization in the supply 
services, the employment of new weapons, or some tactical fundamental.107 
“Sand table exercises” were primarily for training tactical commanders from the 
battalion level down to the rifle squad.108 
Seeckt also introduced, in lieu of the prohibited Great General Staff rides, 
“commander’s rides” (Fuehrerreisen) for the education of future operational 
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commanders. Thereby he laid the foundations for the conduct of German major 
operations and campaigns in World War II.109 The participants were exclusively 
generals—group, division, and infantry or artillery commanders.110 Command-
er’s rides included both army and naval officers.111 The first was conducted in 
1921, to explore national defense in case of sanctions by the Western powers. The 
following year, the scenario envisaged defense against attack by the Czechoslovak 
army.112 The commander’s rides of 1923 and 1928 explored problems of coastal 
defense.113 The chief of the Troop Office (or Truppenamt, as the Reichswehr-era 
general staff was known) conducted annual Troop Office rides (Truppenamt-
reise), also called “chief ’s rides” (Chefreise); participants were chiefs of staff and 
specially selected general-staff officers.114 After the general staff was formally 
reestablished in 1935, general-staff rides (Generalstabsreisen) were restored. The 
Reichswehr formally became the Wehrmacht in October 1935.
In addition to war games, operational thinking was developed by means of 
“operational missions” (Operative Aufgaben). They were not war games in the 
ordinary sense but written studies on hypothetical problems in the future. They 
were worked out by the leading general-staff officers in the Reichswehr Ministry; 
the staffs of group commands, divisions, and the weapons school; and individual 
officers serving in staff positions. About three hundred officers, from majors to 
two-star generals, were involved in such studies. Their solutions were evaluated 
by the Troop Office.115 For example, in the first “operational mission,” in 1931, 
the scenario was that Germany (Blue) would be involved in a war against France 
(Red) in northern France, while Czechoslovakia (Yellow), with twenty-four to 
twenty-eight divisions deployed in northern Bohemia, would advance to its 
border with Saxony. Germany had available twelve divisions and several cavalry 
units. The Germans would be able to deploy six additional divisions to the west-
ern border. The Germans assumed that the Czechoslovak forces, not completely 
assembled, would cross the border and engage eleven German divisions and one 
cavalry division from Silesia and, in the area of Glatz (then part of Germany, 
now in southwestern Poland), attack deep into their flanks. In the north, German 
forces would feint two attacks but in general would conduct a delaying defense.116
In the first and second “operational missions” of 1932, the scenario envisaged 
war against Poland (Red). (See map 1.) The first “operational mission” of 1932 
was played at the level of the Army Command. The initial situation envisaged 
that the Poles would deploy several armies to Germany’s (Blue) borders, with 
the main effort in the western part of the province of Posen; their aim was to 
attack in the direction of Frankfurt/Oder–Berlin. The Germans would use one 
army in Silesia, in the Oder–Warthe–Bogen area and in East Prussia, two armies 
in Pomerania, and one advancing to a position from which to attack toward the 
southeast.117 Three German armies deployed in Silesia would face the Polish 
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armies. Their task was to secure the province and bind the enemy forces. In the 
solutions presented by the control team and by some 80 percent of participants, 
this task evolved into a rapid offensive against one of the Polish armies. The solu-
tion of the control team required the greatest concentration of forces, combined 
with the highest risk, because of the substantial weakening of the forces facing 
the French.118 
In the second “operational mission” of 1932, the participants played the role 
of the chief of the Army Command. In the scenario, which followed from the 
first exercise, while the German army in Silesia had achieved partial success, the 
main attack, launched from Pomerania, had not achieved decisive success. The 
question was whether, in light of an expected enemy main strike on Berlin, the 
original German plan of a flank attack from Pomerania remained valid. The solu-
tion of a significant number of participants was to shift the weight of the main 
effort (Schwerpunkt) to Silesia. However, after analysis of the chances of success 
and the operational potentials of the enemy and friendly forces, General Wilhelm 
Adam, who played the chief of the Troop Office, retained the original decision.119
In the Reichsmarine (1919–35), a special type of the war game was the “com-
mander’s war game” (Fuehrerkriegsspiel). Participants were naval officers of the 
ranks of captain and above. The games were prepared by the sections of the Navy 
Command (Marinekommandoamt). The director of the game was the com-
mander in chief of the Reichsmarine. Commander’s war games explored strategic 
and operational problems of naval warfare against the background of a possible 
MAP 1
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conflict.120 The Reichsmarine conducted commander’s war games each year from 
1923 to 1927. In 1925 the scenario was a war between France and Germany; other 
states were neutral. Because the postures of Italy and England were doubtful, 
France did not consider redeploying its Mediterranean forces to the North Sea. 
The basic idea was that France would not engage German naval forces in the ini-
tial phase of war but would attack German imports at sea. The main objectives 
of the Reichsmarine were to maintain control in the Baltic, protect Germany’s sea 
imports, and interfere with French shipping.121 
In 1927–29, the Reichsmarine apparently focused on commander’s rides and 
its participation in the army maneuver in the fall of each year. In the Reichs-
marine’s commander’s ride of 1928, the focus was on interdependence of warfare 
on land and at sea. The war game was conducted jointly by the Reichsmarine and 
the army. The scenario was a war with France and Belgium. The hostilities broke 
out after several weeks of tension, by which time the German army had mobilized 
twenty-one divisions and imported war materiel from overseas.122 
MAIN PURPOSE 
In the interwar years, the Germans differentiated overall between “educational” 
(Belehrungspiel) and “testing” (Erprobungspiel) war games. The purpose of the 
educational war game was to educate officers in the use of doctrinal documents 
or a higher commander’s views on a certain aspect of warfare. The purpose of a 
testing war game was to explore strategic or tactical thinking or to develop new 
concepts of troop leadership.123 The war games were conducted on either maps 
or boards.124
Scale
Until the early 1930s, the Germans differentiated between tactical and strategic 
war games in terms of command echelon and scale. Tactical war games were 
designed to provide junior commanders with decision-making experience and 
train them to issue the orders needed to implement their decisions. These games 
were the simplest to organize and execute. They could be conducted without re-
gard to a war situation in a given theater;125 some of these games were one-sided. 
Operational and strategic games, however, were conducted by the highest ech-
elons. Apparently, “operational” war games as such came into use in the early or 
mid-1930s, conducted by operational-level commands. A strategic war game was 
much larger in scope and required greater effort on the part of organizers and 
participants. They simulated warfare in a single or several theaters. In its simplest 
form, an educational strategic game was meant to provide strategic education. In 
a testing strategic game, the aim was to assess operational preparatory work by 
higher staffs. In the Reichsmarine, such games were prerequisites for the execu-
tion of naval maneuvers.126
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In the same period the Germans conducted several strategic war games. In the 
1930s, Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg (1878–1946), minister of war and 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, organized several high-level games 
and staff studies to explore “the problems which the military and political situa-
tion had created for Germany’s national defense and especially to establish a the-
oretical basis for the joint actions of the supreme command of the armed forces 
and high commands of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe in all important areas.”127 
General Ludwig Beck (1880–1944), chief of the Army General Staff, tried in 
1938 (but failed) to impress Hitler, by conducting a war game, with the risks 
of going to war with the Western powers. In June 1938, instead of the annual 
large general-staff ride, he decided to explore in writing the question whether it 
was possible to defeat the Czechoslovak army quickly before France seized the 
Rhineland in the west. He concluded that although the Czechs had formidable 
defenses, it would be possible to defeat them. The Czechoslovak army could mo-
bilize as many as thirty-eight divisions; the Germans would require about thirty 
divisions and three weeks to subjugate Czechoslovakia.128 Beck also asserted that 
any attack on Czechoslovakia would certainly lead to the involvement of France 
and Great Britain and possibly intervention by the United States—a new mul-
tifront war that would mean the downfall of the Third Reich.129 He concluded 
that attack on Czechoslovakia in 1938 could only bring “catastrophic results . . . 
for Germany and for all Europe.” Beck proved to be wrong about catastrophe in 
the short term.130 
Beck’s June 1938 study convinced him that Hitler’s assumptions about limited 
war that year were mistaken; he viewed “as fateful, the military action against 
Czechoslovakia, planned on the basis of these military premises, and must explic-
itly disavow any responsibility of the general staff of the Army for such action.”131 
Germany was not strong enough. Hitler responded that the Wehrmacht was an 
instrument of policy and had only to execute the missions that he gave it, not 
discuss them. Beck replied in turn that he could not accept orders with which he 
did not agree.132 He resigned on 18 August 1938.
The Reichsmarine conducted several strategic and operational war games in 
1929–35. For example, a fleet war game was conducted in March 1931, a strategic 
war game (Strategische Kriegsspiel) in April 1932, a high-command war game 
(Kommandoamtskriegsspiel) in 1933 and 1934, a commander’s war game (Fueh-
rerkriegsspiel) in 1934–35, and a high-command ride (Kommandoamtsreise) and 
strategic war game in 1935. It regularly took part in the army’s fall maneuvers 
and exercises. After 1935 the newly renamed Kriegsmarine conducted strategic 
war games in the winter of 1937–38 and 1938–39. It also participated in the 
Wehrmacht maneuver in Mecklenburg and Pomerania in October 1937. For 
example, in a Navy High Command (Oberkommando der Marine, or OKM) 
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strategic game in the winter of 1937–38, “Kriegsspiel-A,” the aim was to explore 
possibilities and prospects of a sudden opening of hostilities by Germany, test-
ing operational questions and overall naval warfare, questions of high command 
and organization, and the operational possibilities of ship types not yet in ser-
vice.133 Among other things, Kriegsspiel-A elaborated the combat employment 
of the German battle fleet north of the Shetlands; employment of the “pocket” 
battleships in the Caribbean (Deutschland) and in the eastern part of the central 
Atlantic (Graf Spee, Admiral Scheer), and of a heavy cruiser (Hipper) in the west-
ern part of the Indian Ocean (see map 2); war in the Baltic, and the problem of 
importing iron ore from Luleå, Sweden; and the employment of the U-boats in 
the western Mediterranean.134 
The Fleet Command (Flottenkommando), established in September 1933 
with responsibility for all seagoing forces, conducted four distinctive but related 
operational war games: Kriegsspiel-B, -C, -D, and -E.135 Naval operational war 
games were longer than tactical games and consisted of several smaller, tactical 
games played over several days.136 The purpose of Kriegsspiel-B was to explore 
the possibilities of operational warfare in the North Sea and the approaches 
to the Atlantic with France in, first, a defensive posture and later offensive; the 
operation orders that would be necessary during the transition from peacetime 
to tension and then to war; and naval command organization in the North 
Sea.137 Kriegsspiel-C examined operational warfare in the Baltic, specifically the 
offensive posture of the Soviet Union, the effect on the declaration of war of a 
Bruestort–Oeland mine barrier, and U-boat barriers.138 
Kriegsspiel-D’s purposes were to examine the employment of U-boats in the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic from organizational and technical viewpoints; 
to explore the possibilities of mining the approaches to French ports in the 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean; to collect insights about cooperation between 
U-boats and surface ships in trade warfare; and to test the chances of success 
of U-boats armed with guns in commerce raiding.139 The lessons drawn from 
Kriegsspiel-D pertained to the employment of U-boats in the Mediterranean to 
cut off communications between France and its colonies in North Africa and to 
tie up large French naval forces. The game also suggested that the U-boat com-
mander (B.d.U.), Commodore (later Grand Admiral) Karl Doenitz (1891–1980), 
should exercise only overall operational command and control, leaving tactical 
command to the flag officer of the U-boats (Fuehrer der Unterseeboote—F.d.U.) 
in the Mediterranean. The game showed that the local commander would know 
the situation better and have more secure radio communications.140
Kriegsspiel-E was designed to test unified command for cruiser warfare in the 
Atlantic, rehearse cooperation between surface forces and U-boats, explore the 
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supply and organization of the “Staging Service” (Etappendienst—resupply ships) 
for warfare in the Atlantic, and study the value of a base in Duala, Cameroon, for 
operations in the Atlantic.141
The tactical war games that made up Kriegsspiel-A (designated F, G, H, and J) 
were conducted by the Naval Station Commands (Marinestation) N[ordsee]  (North 
Sea) and O[stsee] (Baltic). Naval Station Command N conducted Kriegsspiel-F, 
while Naval Station Command O played Kriegsspiel-G, -H, and -J. Kriegsspiel-F 
looked at operational warfare in the North Sea in the presence of strong French 
forces and explored whether a mine barrier could be laid in the North Sea in a 
timely way and what its effect would be.142 Kriegsspiel-G examined operational 
warfare in the Baltic should the Soviet Union open hostilities. It also asked how 
far the planned mine barrier could be extended and whether it could be laid in 
the face of strong action by the Soviets. Finally, it explored the defensive and 
offensive use of mines in the Baltic and what forces would be required in that 
theater. Kriegsspiel-H was a simulated gunnery duel aimed to test whether the 
German battleships, with 380 mm (fifteen inch) guns, could engage older and 
modern battleships successfully.143 Kriegsspiel-J explored the tactical details of 
the intended Bruestort–Oeland mine barrier—its form, gaps, monitoring, neces-
sary material, and again, laying it in the face of various Soviet attacks.144
The Germans also used operational war games for exploring the combat possi-
bilities of their new panzer and motorized forces. After 1933, the Germans created 
a number of experimental independent tank battalions and regiments, to explore 
the potential roles of each and identify problems. General Beck wished also to 
explore the use of the panzer and motorized units at the operational level. In 1935 
he conducted a general-staff ride looking at how a panzer corps might be used; the 
next year, a general-staff ride explored the employment of a hypothetical panzer 
army. At the end of 1935 Beck recommended that the three new panzer divisions 
(established in October 1935) be used as an independent force “in association 
with other motorized weapons” and for accomplishing “long-range objectives.”145
Organization
The Germans considered the most important prerequisites for successful war 
games to be sound organization and thorough preparation. The key people in 
a game were the director (Leiter), the team leaders (Parteifuehrer), and their 
subordinate leaders (Unterfuehrer).146 The director was the most important. 
In a strategic game, he was responsible for issuing written assignments for all 
participants, the general situation, simulated forces and their order of battle, the 
mission of each side, general orders, and regulations for play.147 Beforehand, the 
director prepared a “letter game” (Briefspiel) to communicate to team leaders his 
intentions; the letter game served as the basis for the conduct of the game. Ide-
ally, the director issued his orders in writing and then followed up with the verbal 
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explanations, in order to prevent misunderstanding and duplication of work by 
team leaders. The director was to maintain during game play a clear picture of the 
decisions of team leaders, their basis, and the resulting employment of forces.148 
Before the game, when necessary, he issued general and individual orders, and 
he discussed with the parties individually the details of preparatory work, so that 
play could begin on the first day.149
Normally, the director was not selected by seniority or rank but according 
to his professional fitness. Among the many requirements for the position, the 
director had to possess a mastery of tactics, knowledge of military or naval his-
tory, and combat experience.150 He had to be imaginative and creative, to make a 
game lifelike and interesting to the players. He needed a thorough knowledge of 
command and control.151 The director had to have cool, businesslike judgment 
and eloquence in describing a situation—the interest of the players could not be 
engaged by dry lectures.152 The director needed a good memory and to be able to 
give players freedom of action and allow the results of their decisions to mature 
without losing the thread of the game or sight of the object to be attained. 
In fact, the Germans considered that the true art of businesslike and beneficial 
war gaming lay in the personality and actions of the director. He alone had the 
power to create many-sided and interesting situations in which new decisions 
had continuously to be made.153 He had full responsibility for preparation, ex-
ecution, and “final discussion” (Schlussbesprechung) or postgame critique;154 ac-
cordingly, he exercised complete authority.155 Preparation of the game required 
thorough knowledge and understanding of all related areas, possible situations, 
and their development; its execution required mental agility and close attention; 
the director needed a good sense of when, where, and how to intervene in the 
course of the game.156 He was required to take a realistic view of the game on the 
basis of the simulated combat situation, for which he needed a thorough knowl-
edge of staff work and a temperament suitable for the specific type of game.157 
One of the main responsibilities of the director was the distribution of roles to 
the participants. Normally, a team leader (commander of a side in a war game) 
was selected for his abilities and regardless of rank. A team leader was responsible 
for his side’s technical execution of the game and its preparatory work.158
The Germans also paid great attention to the quality of the control teams and 
participants in the planning games conducted at the highest levels of command. 
For example, in a planning game conducted by the Reichswehr Ministry in 1927, 
among five members of the control team were Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm 
Adam, who later became a four-star general, and three majors—Wilhelm List, 
Guenther von Kluge, and Walther von Brauchitsch—who would reach the rank of 
field marshal. Among fourteen participants in the same planning game were two 
majors (Erwin von Witzleben and Ewald von Kleist) who became field marshals, 
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and ten captains, five of whom became field marshals (Ernst Busch, Albert Kes-
selring, Erich von Manstein, Friedrich von Paulus, and Walter von Reichenau) 
and five four-star generals (Hans-Juergen von Arnim, Heinz Guderian, Gothard 
Heinrici, Eberhard von Mackensen, and Gerhard Matzki). Another participant in 
the game was Lieutenant Commander Karl Doenitz, later grand admiral and the 
successor to Hitler.159 That so many junior officers in a planning game attained 
high rank in their respective branches is not a coincidence. It implies that their 
high professional and mental abilities were duly noted by their superiors.
The Germans stressed that the sides in a game should have roughly equal 
numbers of weapons specialists, distributed without regard to rank. However, 
the director would take into account the wishes of a team leader. Some officers 
were kept in reserve; not all participated in a game from its beginning. If too 
many officers were placed in reserve, the director would assign one or more to 
assist him in directing the game.160 
Subordinate leaders for each side were assigned only for strategic war games. 
They were normally selected by the director but in some cases at the discretion 
of a team leader. Subordinate leaders had a limited role. In educational games, 
their roles could be changed by the director. The assignment of a large number 
of subordinate leaders would complicate a game, and that had to be avoided.161
Elements
Arbitrarily, the principal elements in the design of a German war game were the 
initial situation (scenario), its sections (Spielabschnitt), and duration—both as 
simulated in the scenario and actual time of play. Selection of the “situation” 
(Lage) depended on the game’s purpose. A situation described the groupings of 
hostile and neutral powers and the events leading up to the opening of hostilities. 
If hostilities had already started, the course of war on land, at sea, and in the air 
to date was described.162 The situation contained everything necessary for a team 
leader to make combat decisions.163 The Germans emphasized that the situation 
should contain a general part dealing with the original state of affairs and a spe-
cific part with such details as organization, the condition and fighting qualities 
of troops, the logistical status, signals and communications, the air situation, 
terrain, and weather.164
The Germans stressed that a war-game situation should be described in such 
a way as to be full of tension and potential for surprise. Its scope would not ex-
ceed what was necessary for clear understanding. The situation had to establish a 
larger framework for the main topic of the game—an operational framework for 
a tactical game, a strategic framework for an operational game. It encompassed 
the situation on the ground, at sea, and in the air, depicted graphically when-
ever possible to allow easier understanding and clarity and to save time.165 The 
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commander of each side was not to be given more information than he would 
receive in an actual combat situation. The mission and the intent of the higher 
commander had to be clearly expressed.166 Finally, the Germans emphasized that 
a situation should be interesting, that it should contain an element of uncertainty 
and not follow past patterns: “impossible” situations are not that unusual in war. 
The missions and orders should be issued in full text and should be phrased with 
particular care.167 
The scenario of a war game usually projected a situation two or three years 
in the future; its political, economic, and other nonmilitary aspects served 
only as background. The Germans repeatedly stressed the need for a simple 
and succinctly described scenario; otherwise, much of the fascination with the 
game would be lost.168 For example, in the Kriegsmarine’s strategic war game 
of 1937–38, it was emphasized that the political framework had been designed 
only to allow the game to explore the possibilities of “operational” warfare; it did 
not represent in any way the view of the German naval high command of what 
the political situation would be in 1940. Political developments in the course of 
the game—for example, entry into the war by Italy or Poland or changes in the 
strategic postures of other states—were meant only to change the initial situation 
and set up new missions for the players.169 
The Germans warned that it was dangerous to conduct a game based on a 
historical event. It was possible to reconstruct the original historical situation, 
but from the very first move by either side everything would change, because the 
imponderables, such as human psychology and the personalities of the individu-
als involved, would be very different from what they had been. Hence, unless 
developments were left to the free play of the opposing sides, the game would 
be unnatural and uninteresting. Still, examples from military and naval history 
might be cited to good purpose if the director could elaborate from episodes he 
had personally witnessed, to illustrate the influence of intangible factors in war.170 
The duration of a war game depended on its purpose and scale. In general, 
operational and strategic games were longer than tactical ones. In the early 1930s, 
the Germans believed that a tactical war game should not take longer than three 
to four hours to play, while higher-level games should last for several days or 
weeks or even months. The shorter the game, the more critical it was for the 
players to make quick and sound decisions. If the game was to be intense and 
maintain the interest of the players, it should not last too long.171 In terms of 
simulated “game time,” the Germans preferred that a section or phase of a game 
should not represent a period longer than a week. A game with a longer phase 
would be complicated to play because it was not transparent to controllers. It 
would lack the unpredictability caused by shifts in the situation, which often 
happen in real combat. Hence, it was better to play a game divided into several 
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shorter phases; the number of examples would be increased and the clarity of the 
situation enhanced.172 
Strategic or operational war games had relatively few days of actual play. 
Most of the time was devoted to “planning studies” (Planstudien), or staff stud-
ies, and discussions between the directing team and participants of problems 
revealed during each phase. For example, the Kriegsmarine strategic war game 
of 1937–38 started on 3 November 1937 and ended on 7 March 1938. The game 
consisted of three phases. The preparation of the initial situation lasted until 22 
December 1937, followed by work on the second situation until 20 January 1938, 
and on the third until 15 February.173 Only six days were devoted to moves by the 
players, all during an admiral’s staff ride (Admiralstabsreise) at Krummhuebel 
(Karpacz today), in Lower Silesia, from 25 February to 7 March.174 The actual 
days of play were 25–26 February (days 1–2), 28 February–1 March (days 3–4), 
and 3–4 March (days 5–6)—there was no play on 2 March. Preparations for the 
final discussion were made on 5–6 March, and the final discussion itself took 
place on the 7th.175
Execution
The director controlled a war game closely. He asked direct questions and insisted 
on equally direct, unequivocal, concise, and clear-cut answers. Long-winded or 
irrelevant expositions were, if necessary, abruptly cut off. The guiding principle 
was to bring out clearly the most important points of a subject; the director was 
responsible for consolidating the thoughts of the participants on the essential 
points;176 he was not to be driven off the subject when other participants were. 
When the director spoke, no other person was allowed to speak. His comments 
started with the side that made the first decision; he would respond to questions 
in a way that fostered reflection.177 He was to express his views in a clear and defi-
nite manner but without personal acrimony. The idea of training and teaching 
was to be paramount.178
The director of the game was responsible for preparing a large number of mes-
sages crafted to confront the players during game play with complex situations.179 
The battle picture was constantly updated. The participants were kept informed 
of the overall situation.180
Shifts from one phase or episode to the next, and the “time jumps” between 
them, depended on the situation. In general, the largest “time jump” was made 
at the beginning of the game, when the opposing sides were the farthest apart; 
the jumps were progressively smaller as the distances were reduced. The director 
could order an unscripted time jump during a game after consultation with the 
team leaders of the opposing sides.181 For each phase, subordinate commanders 
conducted new assessments of the situation and made appropriate decisions.182
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One of the director’s main responsibilities during the game was to keep a 
high level of interest among the players. This means that each phase of a war 
game had to be kept full of uncertainty and drastic developments.183 The direc-
tor influenced the course of the game by issuing reports from friendly forces and 
intelligence on the enemy that imposed substantial changes in the situation.184
The director was to play the game in accordance with the decisions of both 
sides, but he did not know in advance what these decisions would be.185 He was to 
allow sufficient freedom of action to the players but not to let the game to degen-
erate into trivialities. To this end the director could intervene through discussions 
during a particular point in a game in which he could ask briefly questions, make 
statements, and give his reasons. The Germans stressed that it was undesirable 
for a director to interfere with the actions taken or decisions made by players or 
to criticize or correct them. If the players sensed that they could not make deci-
sions themselves, but only the director, then uncertainty, indecision, and reduced 
interest and motivation would result.186 If the team leaders made tactical errors, 
they were not interfered with; subsequent events would show which measures 
were correct and which faulty.187 
A game was to be conducted in such a way that it facilitated a free exchange of 
opinions between the director and the players in conversations that the director 
stimulated by transmitting his knowledge, in the shape of interesting situations 
and his ideas on command and control. The director was to help players develop 
their judgment and their capacity for rapidly arriving at decisions. He was to 
abstain from tedious written work before the game and from long-winded theo-
retical discussions in the course of it.188
The Germans emphasized that warfare is full of uncertainty, that commanders 
must learn to act in conditions of uncertainty, finding their way through sheer 
willpower.189 For this reason the director ensured that players did not have all 
the information they needed to make sound decisions. The commander of each 
side in a game had to build his picture of the situation independently, not let the 
director do it. Very often, commanders forgot that neighboring forces were part 
of the game; this gave directors opportunities to impose unexpected events and 
thereby influence the game in certain directions.190 
German war games ended with a final discussion lasting perhaps half a day. 
It was conducted one or two days after the last play day.191 The final session in-
cluded remarks by the most senior officer present and the director, followed by 
discussion with the participants. The director’s superior stated in his comments 
whether he considered the plan underlying the game to have been suitable and 
to correspond to reality, whether the topic for the game had been completely and 
accurately grasped, and whether the purpose of the game had been achieved.192
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The written report of the final discussion was typically dozens of pages long. 
It was written by the director, with the input of the team leaders, and it reflected 
the level at which the game had been conducted. For example, the final discussion 
report for Kriegsspiel-B of 1937–38, by the commander of the Fleet Command 
(Admiral Rolf Carls), was written at the operational level, from a war-at-sea 
perspective. This document, issued on 12 April 1938, was sixty-eight typewrit-
ten pages long. After a short discussion of the game itself, it focused on such 
operational aspects of war at sea as struggle for sea control, the missions of the 
Kriegsmarine, the importance of bases overseas and neutrals, and the maritime 
theater, as well as the most important episodes of Kriegsspiel-B.193 
The final discussion was not a description of the course of the entire game. 
The director selected the interesting and instructive moments and commented 
on decisions made by the team leaders. The director was to take a stand on all 
important decisions he had made himself and not only to critique those of oth-
ers but suggest specific solutions.194 Both praise and criticism were to be given 
sparingly; any criticism, especially in the oral session, was to be polite and re-
spectful, especially in the presence of junior officers. The director was to state 
clearly—after pointing out that no military problem has a standard solution, 
that for most theoretical problems several solutions are perfectly possible, and 
that his opinion was no sure path to victory—how he would have acted and why. 
Every criticism was to conclude with a statement as to whether the commander 
had accomplished his mission. Finally, the exchange of opinions was not to lead 
to limitless discussion.195
Normally, after the end of a war game the director ordered written “planning 
studies” of problems that had been identified during the game and required elab-
oration. For example, after Kriegsspiel-B the commander of the Scouting Force 
(Befehlshaber der Aufklaerungsstreitkraefte, or B.d.A.) was directed to conduct 
three planning studies. The first, delegated to the flag officer of the Torpedo Boats 
(Fuehrer der Torpedoboote, or F.d.T.), was to assess the protection of German sea 
communications in the Baltic and the chances of success should Soviet forces 
go on the offensive. Second, the flag officer of the Minesweepers (Fuehrer der 
Minensuchboote, or F.d.M.) was to assess the possibility of and chances of success 
in laying the Bruestort–Oeland mine barrier after Soviet attacks on German sea 
communications and also of laying mine barriers before Soviet forces penetrated 
into the central Baltic. The third planning study was to explore the employment 
of the U-boats and S-boats (fast torpedo boats), mine barriers, and aircraft in the 
Gulf of Finland to damage or eliminate the Soviet fleet, and also the use by Ger-
man forces of bases in neutral Finland or Estonia.196 The naval high command 
directed a study, The Problem of the North Sea Theater in a German-British Naval 
War, about seventy pages long, based on the war game.197
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WAR GAMES, EXERCISES, AND MANEUVERS
Prior to 1939, the Germans routinely used war games to examine plans that 
would be tested in large-scale exercises and maneuvers. For example, the concept 
of employing U-boats in groups or screens (popularly called “wolf packs” in 
the West) had its beginnings in the last few months of World War I. The idea of 
employing large numbers of U-boats in groups and on the surface was revived 
during naval war games in the early 1930s. Shortwave radio had now made it 
possible for the first time for the U-boat command to direct from headquarters 
on board a ship or ashore the movements and coordinate the attacks of several 
groups of boats. This concept was first tested in practice during Wehrmacht 
maneuvers in the fall of 1937. The commander of the U-boats, Commodore 
Doenitz, controlled his boats deployed in the Baltic via shortwave radio from a 
submarine tender at Kiel. On the basis of these exercises Doenitz requested that 
a command ship equipped with the latest communications be built for the com-
mand and control of U-boats in case of war.198 
In the winter of 1938–39, during the navy’s strategic war game, Doenitz 
conducted an operational game to explore the employment of U-boats in the 
open Atlantic, with special reference to attack in groups, command and control, 
organization, the location of enemy convoys, and the massing of additional U-
boats for final attacks. In this game no restrictions were placed on either side. The 
officer in charge of the convoys had the entire Atlantic at his disposal and was 
free to select their courses. Game play suggested that for Commander, U-boats 
to exercise complete control of the U-boats in a theater and to conduct joint 
operations from a command post ashore was not feasible. Doenitz then decided 
that he should direct himself the broad operational and tactical organization of 
U-boats in their searches for convoys but that the command of actual operations 
should be delegated to a subordinate in a U-boat positioned at some distance 
from the enemy and remaining as far as possible on the surface. Doenitz accord-
ingly ordered a certain number of submarines under construction to be fitted 
with communications needed for that role. Another finding of the game was that 
given the number of U-boats then available and planned, the Germans could not 
expect, in a war against merchant ships in the next few years, to do more than 
inflict a few pinpricks.199
In May 1939, after further large-scale exercises in the North Sea, U-boats con-
ducted an exercise in group tactics off Cape Finisterre and in the Bay of Biscay. In 
July 1939 Doenitz (by then promoted to rear admiral) conducted a similar exer-
cise in the Baltic. All these exercises proved to Doenitz that his concept of using 
U-boats in groups was well-founded. (Nevertheless, the German naval high com-
mand continued to believe that in the next war U-boats would be employed indi-
vidually.)200 Doenitz also used lessons learned from the winter exercise of 1938–39 
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to argue that a successful war against British maritime trade would require a force 
of at least three hundred U-boats, mainly of the 517- and 750-ton types.201
Rehearsing Operations Plans
In the interwar years the Germans invariably looked for potential problems 
in operational ideas or plans for pending or future operations by conducting 
war games, preferably planning games. For example, General Helmuth Felmy 
(1885–1965), commander of the Luftwaffe’s 2nd Air Fleet, conducted on 2 May 
1939 a planning game, covering a period of four to five days and based on the 
then current deployment of his units.202 The main purpose was to explore the 
possibility of a successful air war against Great Britain. The game was considered 
so important that it was attended by General Erhard Milch (1892–1972), state 
secretary for air transport and inspector of the Luftwaffe; Colonel (later General) 
Hans Jeschonek (1899–1943), the newly appointed chief of the Luftwaffe General 
Staff; Generals Albert Kesselring (1885–1960) and Hugo Sperrle (1885–1953), 
commanders of the 1st and 3rd Air Fleets, respectively; and the director of the 
command section (Fuehrungsabteilung) of the Fleet Command and several of 
his aides.203 
The conclusion drawn by the planning game was that should hostilities be 
opened in 1939, a quick victory using airpower could not be achieved. (This 
agreed with a Luftwaffe General Staff study, Operational Objectives for the Luft-
waffe in Case of a War against England in 1939, of 22 May 1939.)204 The reasons 
given were insufficient range of the He-111 bombers to attack the ports on the 
British west coast; a limited ability to attack the British surface fleet; the inad-
equacy of training for attacks against sea targets and in extended bad weather 
conditions; the small number of aircraft capable of long-range operations; and 
the existence of too many potential targets and too large a combat area for the 
number of aircraft available.205 
The Germans assumed that the major part of the Royal Air Force would be 
deployed to France, for “tactical” and political reasons.206 Nonetheless, the 2nd 
Air Fleet concluded that the Luftwaffe’s efforts against British imports would not 
have decisive effect. Instead, “terror” attacks on London would be the strongest 
option; they would have a catastrophic effect on the British capital, although 
they would also increase British resistance. Luftwaffe attacks on the British Ex-
peditionary Corps could not be expected to have decisive effect, because the em-
barkation and debarkation ports were beyond effective range. Further, the game 
suggested, attacks on British fighter aircraft would achieve only small success, 
because the British had a well-organized air-defense reporting network at sea and 
on the coast. This, in turn, would increase warning time for enemy fighters and 
therefore their readiness for action. The game predicted heavy losses for German 
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aircraft in attacks against enemy fighters, which also would distract from the at-
tacks on “vital” targets. 
Attacks on the British defense industry and “shadow” industry appeared to 
offer the greatest chances for success. Such attacks would have long-term effects. 
Because of the wide dispersal of the British airspace industry, defense would 
be difficult, allowing the Luftwaffe to employ the smallest forces.207 Using this 
analysis, the 2nd Air Fleet proposed to use its deployment areas in northwestern 
Germany and, avoiding the defense area around London, to carry out “rolling” 
attacks by its smallest units against the British air industry. Secondary targets 
would be fuel depots and port installations.208
Another conclusion of the 2nd Air Fleet’s planning game was that the frag-
mented command structure of the German coastal air defenses would cause 
considerable friction and reduce the Luftwaffe’s effectiveness. The German navy 
had responsibility for air defense in the coastal fortified areas, which were also 
the Luftwaffe’s deployment and logistical support areas. General Felmy proposed 
the unification of air defenses to achieve a clear chain of command. For him, this 
was not a matter of service prestige but a pragmatic measure for the protection 
of the entire Wehrmacht. Specifically, he proposed the establishment of two air-
defense divisions in the North Sea area, one between the Ems and Elbe Rivers 
and the other between the Elbe estuary and the German-Danish border. (Felmy’s 
proposal was ignored, but efforts were made in April 1939 to enhance coastal air-
defense cooperation between the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe.)209
The Luftwaffe General Staff conducted a general-staff ride in June 1939 be-
cause of the expected war against Poland. This ride included a planning game 
several days long. The scenario envisaged that Germany (Blue) would carry out 
a surprise attack on Poland (Red); Western European powers and Soviet Russia 
were expected to remain neutral in the conflict, and Poland would not undertake 
any mobilization. During the general-staff ride, the lead role in air war was as-
signed to the 1st Air Fleet.210 The main mission of the 1st Air Fleet was initially to 
attack Polish air units on the ground and then prevent the deployment of Polish 
ground forces with the mass of its forces. The Germans envisaged the employ-
ment of the 1st Air Fleet; the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Air Divisions, with their six attack 
(Kampfflugzeug) aircraft wings and one dive-bomber wing (Geschwader); the 7th 
Air Division, with air transport troops and one paratroop battalion; and the East 
Prussia Luftwaffe Command, with one attack and one dive-bomber wing.211
In July 1939 General Franz Halder (1884–1972), the chief (from 1938 to 1942) 
of the Army General Staff, conducted the last general-staff ride (Generalstabs-
reise) prior to the outbreak of World War II. The purpose was to rehearse the plan 
for war against Poland. The movements of the Blue party were almost identical 
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to those that would be actually carried out that September. For example, the 
surprise mass breakout by the Polish grouping at Poznan on 9 September against 
General Johannes Albrecht Blaskowitz’s Eighth Army was played during the plan-
ning game. (In the actual event the attempt failed, because of the energetic action 
of General Kurt von Briesen’s 30th Infantry Division assigned to protect the flank 
of the Eighth Army.)212
In the German army, deployment instructions (Aufmarschweisungen) were 
drafted by the Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH). Cor-
responding deployment orders were then issued by lower headquarters to sub-
ordinate units.213 Such orders set the initial employment of all forces in a major 
operation or campaign. In many cases the enemy situation was known in great 
detail. The campaigns in the west in May 1940 and in Soviet Russia in June 1941 
were thoroughly gamed in advance.214 In these campaigns, every commander 
down to the company level was completely familiar with his initial mission, the 
nature of the forces facing him, and the difficulties that he might encounter.215
Prior to the campaign in France and the Low Countries, the Germans used 
war games and exercises of all types to prepare all officers and even NCOs. The 
extended waiting period before it began gave ample opportunity to rehearse the 
plans. For this reason the first days of fighting went without friction and accord-
ing to plan; almost nowhere was it necessary for the higher command echelon 
to intervene.216 Among other things, problems of troop concentration and initial 
operations were studied. The Army General Staff conducted a war game for sev-
eral days between Christmas 1939 and the new year to explore the main thrust 
through the Ardennes. It was directed by General Carl-Heinrich von Stuelpnagel, 
the Quartermaster-General I (OQ I) (Operations) and deputy chief of the Army 
General Staff at Zossen, near Berlin. The Blue force was commanded by an officer 
of the Army General Staff, Red by the chief of the general staff ’s Foreign Armies 
West department (Colonel Ulrich Liss). This game was based on the German 
operations plans and the enemy situation as known at the time. The Red side’s 
leader was supposed to make decisions from the viewpoint of an enemy com-
mander. The purpose of the game was to raise and discuss controversial problems 
within a specially selected circle. The war game was conducted with breaks, each 
new phase starting with a probable situation at a particular time. The lessons 
learned were evaluated by Stuelpnagel and reported to General Halder.217 The war 
game showed the compelling effectiveness of a thrust through the Ardennes.218
An Army General Staff planning game was also played, testing in great detail 
the possibilities of and the time needed for traversing the Ardennes with panzer 
units. All available German and the Belgian maps were used, as well as aerial pho-
tographs of terrain. The capacities of the roads, secondary routes, and parking 
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sites had to be entered in small-scale maps in such a way as to give cartographi-
cally correct pictures of where columns and individual vehicles were at any time 
and of security distances and intervals between marching units. Play was based 
on the use of panzers in peacetime and in Poland. Both the war game and the 
planning game gave Halder information useful for his final plan of operations. 
He supplemented that information by personal trips to deployment areas.219
The commanders of various corps and divisions conducted their own plan-
ning games in preparation for the campaign against France and the Low Coun-
tries. For example, General Georg-Hans Reinhardt, commander of XLI Panzer 
Corps, conducted on 24 April a planning game to rehearse the deployment plan 
for his corps. This planning game revealed serious flaws in the plan for Panzer 
Group (Panzergruppe) Kleist (named after its commander general, Ewald von 
Kleist) (of which XLI Panzer Corps was a part). Reinhardt’s corps was to pass 
General Heinz Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps, so that the two would reach the 
Meuse River almost simultaneously. This meant that it would be necessary to 
shift temporarily into a combat sector to the north of that assigned to Panzer 
Group Kleist; the infantry corps advancing on Guderian’s right would have to 
stop on reaching the Belgian-Luxembourgian border so that Reinhardt’s corps 
could veer out to the right through the corridor that would be developing. Rein-
hardt believed that such a complicated movement was irresponsible and posed 
an unjustified risk. Just four days before the start of the offensive Reinhardt was 
confronted with a disaster: he was now to have only two movement routes, be-
cause of changes in the deployment plans.220
Guderian’s corps was assigned the sector of the main weight of effort for the 
entire Panzer Group Kleist. It was to advance through southern Luxembourg 
and the southern corner of Belgium, reaching the Meuse River at Sedan. Suc-
cess would heavily depend on close cooperation with the Stuka dive-bombers 
commanded by General Wolff von Sutterheim and his superior, the commander 
of II Fliegerkorps (Air Corps), General Bruno Loerzer. Guderian arranged for a 
four-hour bombardment by the Stukas prior to and during his crossing of the 
Meuse. Guderian conducted a planning game, to which he invited airmen, about 
the pending operation. He also took part in a war game organized by Loerzer.221 
After the start of the campaign, on 12 May, Guderian received an order from 
Kleist to attack across the Meuse the next day at 1600. He protested that order 
because one of his divisions, the 2nd Panzer, would not be ready to attack with 
his other two. Kleist refused to change his orders, arranging with General Sperrle, 
commander of the 3rd Air Fleet, to start mass bombing attacks simultaneously 
with an artillery barrage. Kleist’s order would endanger a meticulously worked-out 
plan for Luftwaffe support that Guderian had made with Loerzer, of which Kleist 
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had been unaware. Yet Guderian issued the same order he had prepared during the 
preparatory planning game, changing only the date and time of attack.222
When the battle at Sedan started at 1600 on 13 May, Loerzer’s bombers and 
dive-bombers applied the tactics that had been rehearsed during Guderian’s 
planning game at Koblenz. Strangely, Kleist did not contradict Guderian’s deci-
sions.223 In fact, during the night on 13 May, Guderian called Loerzer and asked 
him whether he had received any change of orders prior to that attack at 1600. 
He learned that Sperrle’s order had in fact been issued but was passed too late 
to the squadrons and that Loerzer quite correctly did not make modifications in 
the existing plan.224 Guderian did not receive a single order from his superiors 
on what to do after crossing the Meuse. He later claimed that he received none 
until he reached the English Channel at Abbeville on 21 May; in the meantime 
he issued all orders himself.225
In the summer of 1940, during the preparations for the planned German 
invasion of England (Operation Sea Lion, or SEELOEWE), General Ernst Busch, 
commander of the 16th Army, conducted a planning game. The participants 
included the division commanders, their operations and supply officers, navy 
and Luftwaffe staff officers, and the commandants of the North Sea ports. The 
purpose of the planning game was to rehearse the movement of the attack waves 
from assembly areas to their landing beaches on England’s southern coast and the 
establishment of a lodgment. Among other things, the planning game revealed 
how small were the capacities of the ports between the Scheldt and Somme 
Rivers, in comparison to the large number of barges, freighters, and lighters, 
normally used on rivers, that had been hastily rebuilt for crossing the channel.226 
Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch (1881–1948), Commander in Chief of 
the Army (1938–41), attended troop exercises conducted by the Ninth Army 
(General Blaskowitz) and the Sixteenth Army in the fall of 1940. General Halder 
attended war games conducted by the Ninth and Sixteenth Armies in late Sep-
tember and the beginning of October 1940. On the basis of the lessons learned 
during these war games, Halder issued corresponding orders to both armies for 
the contemplated invasion of England.227 
One of the early plans for the German invasion of the Soviet Union (code-
named OPERATIONSENTWURF OST, or Operational Design East) was developed 
by General Erich Marcks, chief of the staff of the Eighteenth Army in Bromberg, 
West Prussia, on the instructions of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht 
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW) in July 1940.228 That plan was 
further developed by General Friedrich Paulus, Quartermaster-General I and 
deputy chief of the Army General Staff, in November and December 1940.229 
Paulus was responsible for coordination of all planning for the campaign.230 
Particular attention was given to the distribution of forces and the selection of 
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operational objectives; these points were rechecked and clarified in a planning 
game held on 29 November and on 2, 3, and 7 December, at Zossen.231 The stra-
tegic objectives of the campaign had been determined by Hitler, while opera-
tional objectives had been issued by Halder, as chief of the Army General Staff. 
The participants in the planning game were section chiefs of the Army General 
Staff, several other army officers, and a Luftwaffe general assigned to the OKH. 
The game’s purpose was to rehearse preparations for the operation under con-
sideration; specifically, the questions to be explored were command and control 
for reaching the Kiev–Minsk line; the employment of Army Group South, which 
would be advancing from southern Poland and Romania; and the difficulties of 
operations from Romania.232 Paulus conducted three related planning games: 29 
November and 2 December, the Part I game (Eastern Study)—distribution of 
Russian forces, Russian fortifications, discussion of the operational “possibilities” 
after reaching the first operational objectives; 3 December, the Part II game (East-
ern Operation, or Ostoperation)—border engagements and operations until the 
Lake Peipus–Minsk–Kiev line; and 7 December, the Part III game—operational 
possibilities east of that line (see map 3).233 
On 28 November, the tasks of the three army groups involved were given to 
their respective chiefs of staff, who independently conducted planning games to 
assess those tasks. Halder’s purpose was to put the preparations for the campaign 
on a broader footing.234 Participants were directed to prepare operational drafts 
by themselves, without the assistance of other army group commanders.235 The 
conclusion of all the game phases was that the German forces would prove in-
sufficient if they failed to break Soviet resistance decisively before reaching the 
Kiev–Minsk–Peipus Lake line.236 
Another conclusion was that the weight of main effort should be the advance 
from Poland.237 It was also concluded that large numbers of infantry operating 
jointly with the 1st and 2nd Panzer Groups would be required to complete the 
planned encirclement of the Soviet forces in the Minsk area; otherwise panzer 
forces would not be able to continue their advance.238 Further, the time Army 
Group North would require to capture the Baltic states would cause a delay in 
the advance of its right flank, thereby endangering the left flank of Army Group 
Center. The most important lesson, however, was that a quick outcome could 
be achieved only by encircling and capturing the Soviet capital, Moscow. Hence, 
the main task of Army Groups North and South would be to protect the flanks 
of Army Group Center.239 The accomplishment of initial (operational) objec-
tives along the line running from the Dnepr River to the south of Kiev through 
Rogachev, Orsha, Vitebsk, Velikiye Luki, and Pskov to Pernau (Pärnu) would be 
a prerequisite for a decisive attack on Moscow. Another lesson was that the Ger-
man forces would require a three-week pause for buildup of supply lines and 
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resupply. The offensive could be resumed on the fortieth day after the start of 
the campaign.240 
Paulus conducted another planning game on 13–14 December at Zossen.241 
The reason for this planning game was the need to elaborate further the planned 
attack on the Soviet Union on the basis of the OKW instruction of July 1940.242 
On 18 December, Hitler directed the OKW to issue Instruction Nr. 21 for the 
invasion of Soviet Russia, code-named BARBAROSSA. The participants included 
chiefs of various sections in the Army General Staff, a few other, senior officers, 
and again a Luftwaffe general.243 The Red side was played by the Chief of Foreign 
Armies, East (Lieutenant Colonel Eberhard Kinzel) and his two aides. The main 
purpose was to work through the theoretical possibilities for initial troop move-
ments, on the basis of written studies.244 This exchange of views would result 
in draft initial-deployment instructions.245 The participants also examined the 
options available for continuing operations after successful preliminary engage-
ments.246 The focus was purely on strategic leadership, the current situation, 
and concealment of the offensive intent; occupation of the rear areas was not 
discussed.247
During the planning game, cooperation between the armies and panzer 
armies was addressed, as well as command and control. Issues included coopera-
tion in Army Group South between the forces deployed in Romania (Armies A 
and B), those in southern Poland (Armies C and D), and the First Panzer Army; 
the separation line between Army Groups North and Center; the danger to the 
flank of Army Group North; the regrouping of forces after accomplishment of 
the first “strategic” (actually operational) objectives on the Dnepr River–Upper 
Dvina River–Peipus Lake line and the continuation of the offensive; reserves; 
and Luftwaffe support to the ground forces. The question of cooperation by the 
Kriegsmarine with other services was not raised.248 In the game the Germans as-
sumed that on day X+20 of the eastern campaign, their forces, after heavy fight-
ing in the border areas of western Ukraine and Belorussia and in the Baltic states, 
would have accomplished, in terms of space and time, the initial objectives of the 
campaign plan. The players’ conclusion was that a three-week operational pause 
for rest and resupply would be necessary before resuming the offensive toward 
Moscow. The Germans calculated that the Soviets would lose about 50 percent 
of their strength in the initial battles in the border areas and would be unable to 
carry out a strategic counterattack.249
The Army General Staff conducted yet another planning game on 17–20 
December to explore the massive problems of supplying the German forces in 
the pending eastern campaign. This game was directed by General Eduard Wag-
ner, Quartermaster-General III (OQ III) (Supply and Transport, Organization 
and Technology). The Russian campaign would require logistical support and 
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sustainment for about three million men, 600,000 horses, and 650,000 motor 
vehicles as far as 435–500 miles from initial deployment areas. The results of 
the planning game were summarized in a study, Foundations of Command and 
Control of Supply in Wide-Ranging Operations in Sparsely Populated Areas, sent 
to all frontline major commands in February 1941. Halder and Paulus spoke of 
the need to produce special winter clothing. However, that could not be done 
without a corresponding increase in raw-material allocations, and that in turn 
required Hitler’s approval. Halder asked Brauchitsch to present the problem to 
Hitler. Brauchitsch did so, but Hitler dismissed these concerns, insisting that the 
campaign would be over before winter.250 
On 5 February 1941 Army Group South conducted an operational planning 
game, dubbed OTTO, for the invasion of the Soviet Union.251 The exercise was 
directed by General Halder; General Georg von Sodenstern, chief of the staff of 
Army Group South, handled the details.252 Preparation for the game started on 7 
January and was completed by the 27th.253 Among other things, the players pre-
dicted the destruction of some 240 Soviet divisions, which would leave only sixty, 
and that the Soviets would not be able to recover from these losses. (In the actual 
invasion, the Germans in fact quickly destroyed 248 Soviet divisions, but they then 
faced not the sixty divisions predicted in the planning game but 220 divisions.)254 
On 1 February 1941 the Army General Staff issued deployment instructions 
to all three army group commanders, who then conducted planning games and 
developed their operational designs. The final plans of the army groups were 
prepared by exchanging views with the Army General Staff. A final meeting about 
the eastern campaign was held on 4 and 5 June at Zossen, where orders from the 
army-group to the division level were clarified in accordance with the common 
mission.255
War Games in Combat
The Germans conducted war games during pauses in combat to study problems 
the actual situation on the front would pose.256 For example, on 2 November 1944, 
during Operation WACHT AM RHEIN (Watch on the Rhine, popularly known in 
the West as the Battle of the Bulge), Army Group B, under Field Marshal Walther 
Model (1891–1945), rehearsed defense measures against a possible American 
attack at the boundary between the German Fifth and the Seventh Armies. The 
leading commanders and their staff officers assembled at headquarters for the 
planning game, which had just started when a fairly strong American attack was 
launched in the Huertgen–Gemuter Forest area. Model immediately ordered 
that with the exception of the commanders directly affected by the attack, the 
participants were to continue the game, incorporating reports from the front in 
the course of play.257 For the next four hours the situation at the front—and in the 
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planning game—became critical. The 116th Panzer Division (Der Windhund, or 
Greyhound) had to be placed at the disposal of the threatened army. It happened 
that its commander, General Siegfried von Waldenburg, who was engaged in the 
planning game, was receiving a series of game orders to that very effect from 
Army Group B and the Fifth Panzer Army. In a few minutes Waldenburg issued 
not simulated orders at the map table but real ones to his operations officer and 
couriers. His division was alerted and set in motion in the shortest possible time. 
Pure chance had changed a simple planning game into stern reality.258
In the spring of 1944, General Friedrich Dollmann, commander of the Ger-
man Seventh Army, had been responsible for the defense of Brittany and Nor-
mandy. He decided to conduct a planning game at Rennes on what proved to be 
the very day of the Allied invasion, 6 June, believing that because of bad weather 
the attack would not come that day. All his corps and division commanders were 
at Rennes when the Allies landed. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commander of 
Army Group B, was also absent that day, visiting his wife in Germany. Dollmann 
sent the 21st Panzer Division to counterattack, but the attempt failed. He then or-
dered General Fritz Bayerlein’s Panzer-Lehr Division toward the front. Bayerlein 
protested that the movement would be conducted in daylight and his division 
would be decimated from the air, but he followed orders. As a consequence his 
division lost five tanks and some 120 other vehicles to Allied aircraft and was not 
ready to counterattack until 9 June, when it was repulsed by the Allies.259 
CLEAR THINKING, SOUND AND RAPID DECISIONS
The modern war game emerged in Germany in the late eighteenth century and 
the first three decades of the nineteenth. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
most of the militaries of major European powers, as well as of the United States 
and Japan, had adopted the German methods. The golden age of the German 
war gaming came during the era of Hans von Seeckt, when the number and 
types of games played greatly increased, compared with prior to 1914. The main 
reason was the severe restrictions placed by the Versailles Treaty on the size and 
composition of the new Reichswehr. Another reason was the extremely difficult 
economic and financial situation in Germany in the 1920s. 
War gaming greatly contributed to the superb level of professional education 
and combat training in the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht, to which in the interwar 
years no other military came even close. The Germans showed that war games 
could be used effectively and creatively to educate future commanders and their 
staffs at all levels of command and to train them in estimating situations and in 
making rapid and sound decisions. War games greatly enhanced the prepara-
tion of their officers in all aspects of warfare, at all echelons; games also tested 
new methods and checked fundamentals of doctrinal documents. The German 
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experience shows that war games, in combination with the study of military and 
naval history, have inestimable value for the operational thinking of high com-
manders and their staffs. 
The Germans paid close attention to the preparation and execution of war 
games. Directors of games were selected by fitness for the position rather than 
rank. They had to possess not only solid knowledge and understanding of the 
theoretical and practical aspects of warfare but also strong personalities and 
characters. 
In the war games themselves, the Germans stressed the importance of simplic-
ity and realism in the initial situation. Political aspects of the situation provided 
only the framework for a game; they were not allowed to dominate it. The Ger-
mans emphasized repeatedly the importance of thinking and presenting ideas 
succinctly and logically. They paid great attention to the thorough preparation 
of a war game and devoted far more time to discussion and reflection than to the 
actual play. The Germans also invariably expended considerable effort in writing 
planning studies on the problems identified during a game. One of the perhaps 
most important elements of the German way of war gaming, however, was the 
final discussion, verbal and written—not a mere formality but a thorough analy-
sis of the most important episodes and the lessons learned.
War games were routinely used at all levels of command in rehearsing current 
and future plans, for which the “planning game” seems to have been the preferred 
vehicle. In most cases the Germans were able thereby to identify problems that 
might arise in execution. Another benefit was that all commanders and their 
staffs became intimately familiar with the situations in the prospective operating 
areas. This made it much easier to carry out the operation.
The German way of war gaming was the product of the German national 
character and way of warfare. It cannot be easily transplanted elsewhere, if at all. 
Yet many aspects of German war gaming in the interwar years could be adopted 
today. For example, war games should be conducted often and at all command 
echelons. The diversity of war games should be greatly increased. Game design 
should emulate the focus on simple and interesting initial situations and on 
concise and logical presentation of ideas. Lengthy and prolonged game play is 
less valuable than extensive preparation and discussion. A game should end with 
thorough analysis of its most important events, reflecting the level of command 
at which it is conducted. Problems identified during a game should result in writ-
ten staff studies. Current and future plans should invariably be rehearsed in plan-
ning games or map exercises. War games should be also used for force planning. 
Much greater emphasis should be placed today and in the future on enhancing 
the quality of professional education and training, and of war gaming in par-
ticular. This is especially critical in an era of shrinking forces and severe budget 
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restrictions. Resources for war gaming and professional education should be the 
very last to be cut in the face of national economic difficulties.
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